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Introduction 
 
Debates on the changing nature of sovereignty in the post Cold War world have left 
many diplomats, military planners and academics uninterested.  The debate has been 
widely treated as something of ‘purely theoretical’ appeal with little or no application 
in the real world.  There has been until relatively recently too large a gap between the 
post-structuralist debates on international relations theory and the more empirically 
based literature on conflict resolution and changing forms of governance.  This is 
unfortunate as it weakens both sets of debates.  The evidence of emerging models of 
sovereignty in actual use by political actors, or implied in the pragmatic compromises 
made or being actively discussed by political actors in contemporary nationalist 
politics and in peace making processes, fundamentally challenge the absolutist 
conception of sovereignty.  The traditional Westphalian model of sovereignty, based 
on absolute monopoly of internal force and absolute recognition of external borders 
(subject only to very limited universal human rights provisions) still forms the basis of 
the positivist legal definition of sovereignty but it is being increasingly departed from 
when pragmatic compromises are being negotiated to resolve nationalist conflicts in 
the post Cold War world..  In this context maintaining the fiction of traditional 
sovereignty, while perhaps comforting to voters skeptical of globalization or regional 
integration, actually hampers our capacity to construct models of governance 
appropriate to serious ethnic conflict or areas of contested sovereignty.   
Refusing to recognize the ‘actually existing’ variety and flexibility in models of 
sovereignty within the modern state system creates and reinforces a number of 
problems.  Firstly, it promotes a model of international society which by definition 
says to political actors in a conflict that an offer in negotiations of anything less than 
traditional absolute sovereignty is a second-class offer, while in fact it may well offer 
them substantially the same level of ‘self-determination’ and ‘sovereignty’ as the 
traditional model offers in practice.   If, however, the theory of absolute sovereignty 
grounded in a single state is the only model on offer, and the view is maintained that it 
represents the ‘real’ norm of international society, then we are often faced with 
choices between ever smaller partitioning to create mono-ethnic states (with large 
scale population movements in most cases) or models of minority rights, which seek 
to sharply divide sovereignty and internal equality and effectively ‘buy off’ nationalist 
    
  
demands with promises of social economic and cultural minority rights within a larger 
integrated state.  Neither of these options offers a very bright future.  Regional 
integration may well create the conditions for the successful transformation of 
autonomous regions with ambitions for independence into states within regional 
blocs, such as Scotland and Quebec which are discussed below, but there are clear 
limits to this approach and not all territories offer such geo-political solutions.   
The impact of minority rights approaches on the other hand is severely limited by 
the incomplete nature of even the strongest supranational legal frameworks, in the 
European Union (EU) and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The 
British Government has for example on many occasions, especially in relation to 
Northern Ireland, asserted its national interests over any individual rights guaranteed 
by European institutions.1  Such forms of citizenship will also be limited by the very 
strong individualistic flavour of EU and ECHR citizenship protections, which will 
have less influence when a group focus is required.  Paul Close looks at what he 
perceives to be an embryonic ‘group rights’ ethos in the ECHR but recognizes that 
realpolitik will ensure its limited application.2  Indeed on issues of sex-equality, the 
European (EU) Court of Justice seems to be moving against women-focused 
affirmative equality policies towards more universalist judgments.  If EU and ECHR 
decisions are to be based on individualistic and ‘free market’ universalistic criteria 
then their impact on any subordinated group will be limited.   
 
International minority rights law is also specifically framed in terms of the 
protection of individuals belonging to groups.3  It does not establish rights for 
communities, or rights which can be easily measured or tested on a community wide 
basis.  Neither at present is it an effective method of enforcement, even at the 
individual level.  In this context it is difficult to envisage judgments on minority rights 
being very effective remedies for minority ethno-nationalist communities who feel 
excluded or dominated within their existing states.   Therefore models of citizenship 
                                                          
1Irish Times, 28 September 1995, has extensive coverage of British Government reaction to decisions by the 
ECHR on the ‘Gibraltar’ case, where the Court found the British Government to have breached the Convention by 
killing three unarmed IRA members in Gibraltar 
2 Paul Close, Citizenship, Europe and Change, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995:89-91. 
3The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and 
Linguistic Minorities 1992, has no legal force and there is no monitoring mechanism. 
The Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 1995 is not judicable in 
the ECHR.  The European Convention on Human Rights itself is based strongly on individual rights. 
  
and sovereignty which rely exclusively of offering internal ‘minority’ rights to 
disaffected communities mobilized on a nationalist basis are unlikely to form the basis 
of successful negotiations. 
Basing citizenship on international minority rights law also has the weakness that it 
explicitly treats nationalists in a contested region as a minority of the dominant state.  
The international declarations on minority rights are strongly framed in a context of 
settled and agreed state boundaries.  They are offering ‘minority rights’ as a 
permanent alternative to constitutional change.  This is not a form of citizenship 
which nationalists in ‘minority’ groups within a contested state would readily accept 
and indeed a core element of any conflict resolution approach will need to 
acknowledge the contested nature of the state, and incorporate it into the framework 
of citizenship.  Sovereignty frameworks need to avoid absolutist principles designed 
to reaffirm a particular ‘national’ view of sovereignty.  Solutions to contemporary 
nationalist and ethnic conflicts need to meet peoples’ real demands for self-
determination, while seeking to uphold potentially conflicting rights in some sort of 
just and equitable world order.  This requires a model of sovereignty which is more 
adaptable and more flexible than that described in the traditional texts of international 
relations. 
The acceptance of a changing and more flexible model of sovereignty does not 
require the straw argument that the Cold War or earlier periods represented an 
actually existing model of absolute sovereignty.4  The classical model of a state 
centred world and absolute sovereignty clearly never represented the real post-war 
world.  It certainly did not represent the reality of small states’ decision-making 
processes, which were nearly always framed within a pragmatic recognition of the 
limitations of independence.  Post-colonial states, large and small, usually achieved 
independence in adverse circumstances with many external impediments to 
autonomous decision-making.  Furthermore, security and intervention decisions 
during the cold war saw a high level of covert operations and use of proxy forces by 
the superpowers, which at one level make the contemporary debates on sovereignty 
and intervention seem ahistoric, even allowing for the important distinction between 
covert intervention and open formal intervention by international organizations.   
                                                          
4 J. Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin set out a useful historical overview of the wide-ranging models of 
sovereignty in the post Westphalian world, in ‘The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules of 
Sovereignty in International Relations’, International Organisation 48(1): 107-130. 
    
  
There was no ‘golden age’ of clear UN mandates5, terms of reference were often 
political compromises or holding operations leaving little room for long-term peace 
building.  While the pace of globalization has certainly quickened and has created a 
qualitatively different political world there can be little argument with the view that 
conflict and conflict resolution has frequently breached the idea of absolute state 
sovereignty as a principle of inter-state relations. 
The debate on ‘shared-sovereignty’ has to date been focused largely on the process 
of European integration.  This chapter seeks to widen that debate to other crucial 
arenas of international politics and examines three areas where traditional 
assumptions about sovereignty are clearly inadequate to explain contemporary 
developments.  Firstly it examines the emergence through the 1980s and 1990s of new 
models of sovereignty from the constitutional nationalist parties in Quebec and 
Scotland.  Though as yet unimplemented in either place and still representing a 
minority view (if just so in Quebec) the modern party programmes of Parti Québécois 
(PQ) and the Scottish National Party (SNP) represent a novel and ‘non-traditional’ 
approach to resolving the contest over sovereignty with their Canadian federal/British 
states.   The second section looks at the proposals which have been made by the 
international community to resolve the conflict in Kosovo at the pre-bombing 
conferences in Rambouillet, France and more recently as incorporated into the, United 
Nations imposed, Constitutional Framework of 2001.  Neither the Rambouillet 
proposals or the present Constitutional Framework could be construed as representing 
a traditional Westphalian model of state sovereignty and yet they were drafted and in 
the later case imposed with the support of the worlds most powerful states and the 
wider international community.  Finally and perhaps in the strongest actually existing 
example to date, the 1998 peace agreement in Northern Ireland, which for all its faults 
and the perpetual crisis since its signing offers an agreement and a process which goes 
far beyond an internal power-sharing consociational solution6, both in the compulsory 
structures of external association and in the relatively novel guarantees of citizenship 
rights to Irish nationalists in Northern Ireland, without requiring them to hold any 
duty of allegiance or loyalty to the British state. 
                                                          
5 Fred Halliday 'Peace Process in the late twentieth century: a mixed record' in Michael Cox, Adrian Guelke and 
Fiona Stephens eds., A farewell to arms? From Long War to Long Peace in Northern Ireland, Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2000.  
6 As drawn from the work of Lijphart.  See for example Lijphart, Arend  (1977).  Democracy in plural 
societies : a comparative exploration.  New Haven : Yale University Press. 
  
 
 
Cosmopolitan Nationalism and flexible sovereignty 
 
The upsurge in nationalist political activity in the immediate aftermath of the Cold 
War was initially interpreted as part of the process of collapse7.  Debates centred on 
the extent to which prior nationalist movements helped weaken the Soviet system or if 
the collapse itself simply allowed opportunists to declare themselves nationalists in 
the manner of the Nomenklatura nationalist parties.  More recent debates heavily 
influenced by the wars of dissolution in Yugoslavia have placed nationalist politics in 
clear opposition to the wider processes of globalization, with impact and 
consequences throughout the world.  Nationalist movements are to a large extent 
analyzed as particularist, in opposition to cosmopolitans or globalists8.   While there 
clearly are nationalist movements who constitute themselves in this way - not only in 
the Balkans but among the far right in Western Europe.  It is not the only model of 
late twentieth century nationalism.  Tracing the attitude of West European separatist 
movements to European Integration we can see a sharp shift in attitude among some 
of the more successful long-standing nationalist movements to the EU in particular 
and to their definition of ‘independence’ and sovereignty in general.  (This is not in 
any way to deny the parallel existence and indeed growth of far-right anti-integration 
nationalist parties, though many of them do not have the same historic roots). 
 
Scottish Nationalism and Globalization 
The Scottish National Party opposed Britain’s entry to the European Economic 
Community, as did the Welsh nationalists Plaid Cymru and indeed in Northern Ireland 
the Ulster Unionist Party, the Democratic Unionist Party and both of the then existing 
factions of Sinn Féin.  The SNP clearly saw the European Economic Community as a 
supranational if not imperialist institution which would ‘simply’ replace London rule 
with a mix of London and Brussels rule.  The EEC was analyzed as a threat to culture 
and economic position.  It was perceived to worsen their position vis a vis self-
determination and Scottish sovereignty.  This position slowly changed through the 
                                                          
7 Zvi Gitelman ed., The Politics of Nationality and the Erosion of the USSR, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992. 
8 e.g. Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized violence in a Global Era, Cambridge: Polity, 1999.  
    
  
1980s to one where the SNP is now strongly in favour of European Integration9 in 
general and of the European single currency in particular and argues that small nations 
have had a positive experience in the EU compared to small nations within the 
‘British Union’.10  Their election slogan of ‘Independence in Europe’ emphasizes how 
central the EU has become to their overall political strategy.    
Opinion polls in Scotland show a similar response.  While there has been a 
somewhat varied level of support for Scottish Independence over the years, if a survey 
question specifically asks a respondent if they support ‘independence within the EU’ 
the positive response is higher than in surveys which simply ask about support for 
‘independence’.  Perhaps more strikingly, if a single survey repeats the question with 
and without the EU reference the ‘independence in Europe’ question will almost 
inevitably get the larger positive response.11  The logic of the SNP position here is 
that the British state is now too large to be a source of identity for the Scottish people 
and too distant to reflect their political ambitions but also too small to perform useful 
economic, monetary and security functions.  It is now relatively clear what political 
decisions might be made in Edinburgh; there are also a body of decisions which will 
be made in Brussels (or at the World Trade Organization or the United Nations).  
What is less clear, say the SNP, is what decisions about Scotland, if any, can be most 
usefully made in London.   
The imagery of Ireland in recent Scottish elections presents an interesting picture 
of Scotland’s image of itself as a potential small state.  In the mid-1980s when the 
Irish economy was in deep crisis, the Republic of Ireland featured rarely in the 
discourse of Scottish politics and when it was introduced it was usually by 
Conservative politicians pointing to the fate which faced an independent Scotland - of 
higher unemployment, emigration and debt.  In the most recent Scottish elections the 
SNP have made Ireland a positive feature of their campaign, not in a simple 
successful break-away from Britain argument, but in arguing how smaller states with 
control of some key aspects of macro-policy can respond more flexibly and more 
successfully to the processes of globalization than peripheral regions of larger states.  
Michael Keating drawing on Latouche has argued in the context of Quebec that neo-
                                                          
9 Press Release at SNP launch of European Parliament Election Campaign. 27 May 1999, on snp.org.uk [5 
November 2000]. 
10 Alex Salmond 'Scotland and Ireland', Scottish Affairs 25: 68-77, p. 70-1. 
11 e.g. Brown, Alice et al The Scottish electorate: the 1997 general election and beyond. Basingstoke: Macmillan 
Press, 1999 surveys summarised at p.147. 
  
corporatist responses to globalization are strongest when there is a shared culture12 
and to the extent that social-partnership is one of the defining differences between 
Irish and British policy making there is some weight to the SNP position.  In pointing 
to the Irish macro-policy making model based on an open economy and Foreign 
Direct Investment, but also a highly institutionalized form of social concertation,13 the 
SNP are looking to a comparative model which draws on their rhetoric about a 
distinct Scottish form of politics which is more consensus seeking than the 
Westminster model and the anti-concertation approach at the level of the British state.  
It is however also a model which would manage their interaction with a globalizing 
world rather than try to oppose the process or seek to withdraw from it.   There are 
clearly a number of factors which collectively explain the current strength of the SNP, 
not least of which is the legacy of Thatcherism.  However, contemporary Scottish 
nationalism rests on a vision of itself which is not only at ease with European 
integration and a globalized economy but which positively uses those processes to 
argue the case that now more than ever Scottish independence is a viable prospect and 
that Scottish independence does not require withdrawal from, or opposition to, strong 
supranational institutions – institutions which are significantly stronger that the EEC 
which the SNP opposed up to the 1980s.14   
 
Quebec, Sovereignty and Globalization 
The development of Parti Québécois’ (PQ) nationalist vision in recent years 
follows a similar non-particularist route.  While coming from a background where 
English speakers were barely seen as fellow citizens of Quebec and certainly had 
more limited cultural rights, the contemporary PQ strategy is to stress very strongly 
the inclusive vision of citizenship it espouses.  While obviously committed to 
maintaining a French speaking public culture the relaxation of language laws, some 
                                                          
12 Francisco Aldecoa and Michael Keating eds., Paradiplomacy in Action: the foreign relations of subnational 
governments, Portland OR and London: Frank Cass, 1999, p. 4. 
D. Latouche 'Quebec, See Canada: Quebec Nationalism in a new global age, in A-G Gagnon ed. Quebec State and 
Society.  Toronto: Methuen, 1984. 
13 Peadar Kirby The Celtic tiger in distress : growth with inequality in Ireland. Basingstoke, Hampshire; New 
York, NY : Palgrave, 2002, for a more critical Irish reflection on recent Irish economic and social performance 
than the image used by Scottish nationalists.  
14 Survey confirmation of the strong pro-European integration views of SNP members of both the British House of 
Commons and the Scottish Parliament in a comparative study, Baker, David, Nick Randall and David Seawright 
‘Celtic Exceptionalism? Scottish and Welsh Parliamentarians Attitudes to Europe, The Political  Quarterly p.211-
226, 2002. 
    
  
loosening of restrictions on English language education and in particular the rapid 
response of the party to the outburst of its leader against English speakers and 
immigrants in the aftermath of the defeat of the 1995 autonomy referendum15 shows a 
party committed to an inclusive nationalist programme.  The party’s positive attitude 
to the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA), a currency linked to the 
Canadian Dollar and possible joint citizenship rights with Canada indicates its view of 
sovereignty is one which would not be recognized in a standard political textbook of 
even the late 20th century.16   It could be argued that parties like PQ and the SNP and 
indeed the Catalans are no longer really nationalist-separatist parties in the traditional 
sense but simply regional-autonomy parties.  Yet a state such as the United Kingdom 
with a political rhetoric which is very strong on British sovereignty and national 
interest, is part of a much more highly developed political union and economic bloc 
than NAFTA is likely to become in the foreseeable future, is considering abandoning 
its own currency to join the euro and has had since the Treaty on European Union a 
concrete concept of EU citizen.   If PQ is not a nationalist movement, then is the 
United Kingdom no longer a state? 
PQ and the SNP probably have the most highly developed strategies in this regard 
and this is probably not unconnected to the prospect that they might indeed realize 
their political ambitions before too long.  They are not the only exceptions however to 
a rule which places nationalist politics in a particularist, exclusionary and anti-
integrationist camp.  Certainly Plaid Cymru in Wales, the Convergència Democràtica 
de Catalunya (CDC) in Catalonia, the Partido Nacionalista Vasco in the Basque 
Country, the SDLP and to a lesser extent Sinn Féin in Ireland in recent years have a 
vision of national self-determination which is not hostile to European Integration, 
which is open to a more global world and which certainly proclaims a concept of 
sovereignty which is less than absolute and which accepts that key economic, 
monetary and possibly security issues will not be made at the level of the 
‘independent’ state. 
Of course there are many, too many, counter examples.  I make no attempt to deny 
the anti-cosmopolitan perspective of other nationalist movements.  (Neither of course 
                                                          
15 See Independent (London) 1 Nov. 1995 for details of PQ premier Jacques Parizeau’s attack on English speakers 
and ethnic minorities and his forced resignation within 24 hours 
16 See The Guardian (London) for details and also Financial Post (Toronto) 9 Sept. 1995; Toronto Star 24 Mar. 
1995 for details and critical comment. 
  
have the SNP or PQ ever advocated the violent overthrow of the state.)  The argument 
is that there is diversity.  There is no deterministic relationship between a nationalist, 
even a separatist position and anti-cosmopolitan ideologies which insist on the 
absolute autonomy and sovereignty of independent states.  Furthermore the more 
successful nationalist movements within liberal democracies have political strategies 
which positively embrace national self-determination in circumstances which would 
see them share their sovereignty with regional organizations and even with their ‘old 
enemy’.  Sovereignty for these movements is not seen in the absolutist visions of the 
nineteenth century or in the state-centred views of Realist authors but rather in a more 
multilayered and dynamic format combining function and symbolism to promote 
political goals and self-determination while recognizing the strong globalizing and 
regionalizing pressures in economics, politics and culture. 
 
 
Flexible Sovereignty and Conflict Resolution in Kosovo 
 
The question of sovereignty has featured very significantly in the debate on Kosovo 
but almost exclusively around the issue of the NATO bombing of Serbia.17   The 
extent to which that action represented a new chapter in the meaning of sovereignty in 
creating a precedent for open and declared military intervention for ‘humanitarian’ 
purposes is yet to be determined.  There is another aspect to the Kosovo conflict 
which also raises far-reaching questions and that is the nature of the Rambouillet 
Draft Agreement and the 2001 Constitutional Framework.  If, as seems likely, a 
medium term ‘solution’ to the Kosovo conflict as offered to the Kosovars by the EU 
or the wider international community is not an independent state but some variation of 
the Rambouillet accord and the current Constitutional Framework, the provisions of 
those documents represent a clear indication of current thinking within the 
international community and a model that was at least acceptable to many of the key 
actors in the region apart from the Serbs at Rambouillet.  This type of thinking was re-
enforced by proposals from the German and French governments in early 1999 for 
UN or EU protectorate status for Kosovo within the Yugoslav federation.   In many 
ways Bosnia and Kosovo have become protectorates in practice even if their long-
                                                          
17 E.g. ME O'Connell 'The UN, NATO and international law after Kosovo', Human Rights Quarterly 22(1): 57-89. 
    
  
term future remains unclear.  While overtaken by events and the subsequent bombing 
of Yugoslavia, the Rambouillet accord is worth analyzing as it represented a serious 
proposal, supported by the major world powers, which fundamentally violated the 
normal rules and definitions of sovereignty as articulated in the Westphalian model. 
The opening framework section of the Rambouillet Draft Agreement raises 
questions of status immediately by referring to ‘citizens in Kosovo’, and not Yugoslav 
citizens in Kosovo or citizens of Kosovo.18   The preamble to the constitution drafted 
in Chapter one of Rambouillet sets out the objective of establishing  ‘institutions of 
democratic self-government in Kosovo grounded in respect for the territorial integrity 
and sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and from this Agreement, from 
which the authorities of governance set forth herein originate’.  While the territorial 
integrity and sovereignty of Yugoslavia is respected explicitly, this sovereignty is not 
exclusively derived from the ‘people of Yugoslavia’ but also from the Rambouillet 
Agreement and its provisions.  Under the constitution, the Yugoslav people do not 
have the right to take decisions while are in violation of the Agreement19 and disputes 
about interpretation were to be determined by the Chief of the Implementation 
Mission and not by the Yugoslav (or other) courts.20   There are also explicit 
provisions in the Agreement limiting the deployment of the Yugoslav Army21 and 
Interior Ministry Troops22 and prohibiting the declaration of martial law23.  There are 
further clauses protecting the right of national communities in Kosovo to use their 
own communities’ language and national symbols.  There was finally to be an 
international conference to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo, 
on the basis of ‘the will of the people, opinions of relevant authorities, each Party’s 
efforts regarding the implementation of this Agreement, and the Helsinki Final Act’. 
The provisions of Rambouillet are certainly open to a number of interpretations and 
the extent to which they reflected potential outcomes or were simply a prelude to the 
NATO bombing is open to debate.24   However much of the debate on the extent to 
                                                          
18 Article 4.  Full text of Agreement is available at  
http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/dossiers/kosovo/rambouillet.html 
19 Framework, Article 6 
20 Chapter, 5:5 
21 Chapter 7:4 
22 Article 6 
23 Framework, Article 8 
24 See for example Ivo H Daadler and Michael E O Hanlon Winning Ugly, NATOs war to save Kosovo, Brookings Institute Press, 
2000; Michael Mcgwire ‘Why did we bomb Belgrade?’, International Affairs 76(1), 2000;  Marc Weller ‘The Rambouillet 
Conference on Kosovo’, International Affairs 75(2), 1999;  
Javier Solana ‘NATOs success in Kosovo’, Foreign Affairs Nov/Dec 1999. 
  
which Rambouillet was designed to be rejected and hence to isolate the Serbs, focused 
on the demands therein to deploy NATO troops throughout Yugoslavia.  The political 
provisions of Rambouillet can be taken more seriously as a long term perspective, not 
only because of the support they received at that time but also because many of the 
concepts are repeated in the governance provisions imposed by NATO and the UN 
after the bombing.  This is re-iterated in UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), 
the G8 proposals set out in Petersburg, Germany in May 1999,25 and the 
Constitutional Framework itself.  The UN Security Council resolution, while 
repeating ‘the commitment of all Member states to the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’, explicitly states that the new 
international civil presence in Kosovo will promote ‘substantial autonomy and self 
government in Kosovo’ ‘taking full account of … the Rambouillet accords’.  This 
phrase was also used by the G8 statement in May 1999 and was accepted by the 
government of Yugoslavia in June 1999.  The phrase and the G8 document are 
included in the Security Council resolution, as appendices.  
The Constitutional Framework of 2001 is an even stronger example, as it is an 
actually functioning system of governance, sanctioned by the United Nations and 
accepted, even if not welcomed, by the local parties.  While the Constitutional 
Framework is explicitly transitional it will almost inevitably form the basis for any 
new constitutional document which may be adopted in the near future.  More 
traditional sovereignty models, involving Kosovo independence, re-integration with 
Serbia or partition are at present highly unlikely to gain the support of the 
international community and none of the local actors have the power to secure such an 
outcome. 
The 2001 Constitutional Framework receives its mandate from Security Council 
Resolution 1244.  The Constitution explicitly states that the institutions of self-
government shall ‘exercise their authorities consistent with the provisions of UNSCR 
1244 (1999)’26 and affirms the ‘ultimate authority of the Special Representative of the 
Secretary General (SRSG) for the implementation of [1244]’.  Throughout the 
Constitutional Framework the authority of the SRSG to intervene is affirmed27. There 
is also a long list of areas reserved to the SRSG including ‘external relations’ and 
                                                          
25 6 May 1999, see nrespaper ??? 7/8 May 1999 
26 Chapter 2a 
27 e.g. Chapter 4.6 to protect the ‘rights of Communities’. 
    
  
‘concluding agreeing with states and international organizations in all matters within 
the scope of [1244]’.28  Interestingly the Constitutional Framework, unlike the 
Rambouillet Draft Agreement, does not mention Kosovo’s relationship with 
Yugoslavia/Serbia.  It is simply described as an ‘entity under international 
administration’29 and ‘an undivided territory’30.  While the document, by implication, 
recognizes the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia / the Union 
of Serbia and Montenegro in relying on Resolution 1244 it is not made explicit, within 
the document itself as might be expected. 
The Rambouillet model of sovereignty is incompatible with traditional models, 
unless it is seen purely as a stepping-stone to independence. Yet the international 
community in their formal resolutions and in their practice have shown no support for 
such an outcome.  The main problem with moving away from the current 
‘provisional’ status quo is that there is no agreement on what else to do.  Rambouillet 
was adopted as a pragmatic and transitional document.  It has now become a semi-
permanent framework.  The Yugoslav Government may have had minimal 
international recognition of their borders, including Kosovo, in the document and the 
related security council resolutions but Kosovo was clearly so recognized in a 
technical sense only and the international bodies and governments who were party to 
the Rambouillet negotiations and the later UN resolutions and actions clearly reserved 
the right to interfere in the ‘internal’ affairs of Yugoslavia.  The government of 
Yugoslavia / Serbia cannot freely deploy security forces, police forces, declare martial 
law or control the courts.  They have no effective authority within Kosovo and cannot 
even control the public cultural symbols used by state institutions (though the SRSG 
does retain a veto in this area).  The implementation bodies including the UN and 
NATO are also acting as international guarantors to the Agreement, with a clear threat 
of intervention if the Accord was breached.  In considering the real basis of 
sovereignty whether judged by an internal monopoly on the use of violence or in 
terms of broad legitimacy of right to govern it is clear that Yugoslavia (and now 
Serbia) have had little real sovereignty over Kosovo.  However neither is Kosovo a 
defacto independent state.  It is something else and our conceptualizing of sovereignty 
needs to catch up with reality in this area. 
                                                          
28 Chapter 8 lists all the reserved areas. 
29 Chapter 1.1 
30 Chapter 1.2 
  
  
 
The 1998 Belfast Agreement31 
 
The Good Friday Agreement of 1998 is the most developed example to date of 
enshrined ‘flexible sovereignty’.  The Agreement does not represent Joint Sovereignty 
as the Agreement clearly asserts (but only it must be said in an Annex) that Northern 
Ireland remains part of the UK.  The main body of the text uses the open-ended phrase 
‘the sovereign government with jurisdiction there’.  Nonetheless the provisions of the 
1998 Agreement establish a system of inter-locked institutions and a basis for 
sovereignty and citizenship which go far beyond most previous agreements of this 
nature. 
Even though the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive have been regularly 
suspended by the British Government – against the letter and spirit of the Agreement 
according to some analysts32 – and they remain suspended at time of writing, some 
institutional elements such as the new cross-border bodies remain in existence and 
formal and regular meetings between the Irish and British Governments continue.  
Furthermore, the major institutional elements of the 1998 Agreement will remain in 
any future agreement.  Disputes between the parties have largely focused on other 
issues such as IRA weapons, police reform, and the deployment of British troops out 
of Northern Ireland.  The model of governance and sovereignty, supported at the time 
of signing by the Irish and British Governments, the US administration, the European 
Union and much of the wider international community is likely to remain essentially 
unchanged in any future deal which re-establishes any local political institutions. 
There are a few elements of the 1998 Agreement that do not fit into a traditional 
model of sovereignty.  The British Government has accepted that its sovereign power 
in Northern Ireland is based on the support of a majority there and not on the will of 
the wider British public.  If a majority in Northern Ireland vote for Irish Unity, the 
British Government is committed to legislating for that.  (A commitment it has yet to 
make with regard to Scotland interestingly).  The devolved Assembly in Northern 
                                                          
31 Full Text of Agreement available on the website of Dublin City University’s Centre for International Studies:  
http://www.dcu.ie/~cis/Agreement.htm 
32 O’Leary, Brendan, ‘Agreement is not Devolution in Unitary State’, The Irish Times 11 October 2001. 
    
  
Ireland is strongly linked to the ‘all-Ireland’ North-South Ministerial Council.  The 
Agreement states that ‘they are mutually interdependent’ and that ‘one cannot 
successfully function without the other'’.  Participation by Ministers in the North-
South Council is ‘one of the essential responsibilities ‘ of Ministers33.  While 
nationalists, especially Sinn Féin, strongly supported the North-South body they had 
opposed the creation of any Northern Ireland assembly until the final stages of the 
negotiations.  In contrast the Unionists strongly supported a devolved assembly within 
Northern Ireland but opposed cross-border bodies.  By locking the two together, 
political actors had only a single choice, to accept the entire package or reject it in its 
entirety.  The motivations of the actors in finally reaching agreement is the topic of 
another paper34 but the design of the agreement certainly aided a comprehensive 
agreement and helped to prevent cherry picking. 
Analyses of the Agreement which seek to minimize the North-South Council and 
place it on a par with the Nordic Council are missing one of the essential elements of 
the Agreement.  Neither the Northern Ireland Executive nor the British Government 
has a monopoly of authority or sovereignty, unless they use their ultimate power to 
collapse the Agreement.  All actors are required by the structure of the Agreement 
itself to operate the institutions and to do so within certain limits.  The Swedish 
Government is not required to have cross-border bodies with other Nordic states even 
if it chooses from time to time to create such bodies.  More significantly if the Finnish 
Government withdraws from the Nordic Council, the Finnish Government and 
Parliament does not collapse. 
The more ‘internal’ elements of the Agreement also challenge some of the 
traditional assumptions about sovereignty and citizenship.  The Agreement guarantees 
the right of people in Northern Ireland to hold Irish or British citizenship.  It also 
guarantees full equality of citizenship, without requiring nationalists to give allegiance 
to the state or loyalty to the government.  In this regard one of the central, if often 
unspoken assumptions of modern citizenship is breached.  Citizenship rights are often 
preceded by duties, especially the duty to give allegiance to the state and to defend it 
                                                          
33 Art. 4.2. 
34 For further background on the negotiations and the Agreement see for example John Doyle ‘Citizenship in 
Contested States Post 2000: The Northern Ireland Peace Agreement and its Global Implications’ pp. 173-196, in 
Sai Felicia Krishna-Hensel (ed.) The New Millennium: Challenges and Strategies for a Globalizing World.  New 
York: Ashgate, 2000.; and John Doyle ‘Towards a Lasting Peace’? : the Northern Ireland multi-party agreement, 
referendum and Assembly elections of 1998’, Scottish Affairs, no. 25: 1-20, 1998. 
  
in time of need.  This has been dispensed with despite a long standing unionist 
insistence that nationalists could not demand power-sharing or further moves towards 
equality in Northern Ireland unless they showed at least minimal allegiance to the 
state - often expressed in the demand that ministers at least hold British passports and 
that parties support the RUC.35 
The strength of the Agreement is that it does not require the building of a middle 
ground where none, or almost none exists.  Neither did it require a sudden conversion 
by the chief political actors.  It introduced a new dynamic into the situation through a 
sustained period of external intervention and created a new political and constitutional 
structure which allowed political actors to work the Agreement.  Certainly 
interpretations differ and it is a dynamic process rather than a final status agreement 
but nonetheless it has at the very least created the potential for peace and progress. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The modern party programmes of the Scottish National Party and Parti Québécois 
offer models of sovereignty, within enshrined supranational institutions and with 
acceptance of key aspects of state policy on monetary, trade, citizenship and even 
security being permanently grounded in international agreements and institutions.  
Such institutions are not simply the proposed choice of a ‘sovereign’ government, 
who might decide otherwise, they are presented as a fundamental part of the 
sovereignty package – the context within which sovereignty takes place.  The 
negotiations in Kosovo and Northern Ireland have thrown up models of sovereignty 
where traditional visions of sovereignty may be fudged to create a viable long-term 
solution. There are clearly other examples of equal strength which it is beyond the 
scope of this paper to develop.  In Bosnia there is a clear need for imaginative 
solutions to create a space to build a functioning state of Bosnia-Herzegovina based 
on some form of power-sharing between ethnic blocs while allowing for structured 
                                                          
35 James Molyneaux, House of Commons, 15 June 1982, vol. 25, col. 781, opposed power-sharing with anyone 
who 'wanted to belong to a foreign republic'. 
Martin Smyth (UUP) insisted that ‘a person ceases to have citizenship when he takes a passport from another state’ 
(House of Commons, 8 June 1982, vol. 25, col. 107). 
David Trimble Speech to the Irish Association, 20 November 1998, [www.uup.org, 9 February 1999], argues that 
the agreements requires support for the state and the police from those who seek government posts. 
    
  
links between the Croats and Serbs and their neighbouring states.  The weakness of a 
broader civic identity certainly creates problems in designing functional institutions 
but it is not insurmountable.  The alternative of a crisis-driven partition with no wider 
agreed structures, with the inevitable impact that would have throughout the region 
should be sufficient motivation to seek other solutions.  There may be a form of 
stability at present under the protectorate-ship of the international community but it is 
not a solution and has not led to the development of a viable state structure. 
It is possible to analyze the Middle East peace process as an affirmation of 
traditional sovereignty.  Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and ultimately from the 
Golan Heights restores state-sovereign boundaries with those countries while partition 
and Palestinian statehood could be construed in a traditional manner.  However the 
draft agreement for the ‘permanent status’ negotiations as set out in the Oslo Accord36 
draws a wider picture.  It is impossible to see any resolution of issues such as 
‘Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and co-
operation with other neighbors’ within the parameters provided by traditional state-
sovereignty.  Furthermore though not mentioned even in the Oslo Accords the issue of 
Palestinian citizens of Israel, will need to be addressed in any long-term settlement.  
Already there is evidence that Palestinians within Israel feel abandoned to some 
extent by the PLO in a manner reminiscent of nationalists in Northern Ireland after 
partition37.  If the permanent settlement leaves them a weak minority in an explicitly 
Jewish state how might there concerns be addressed?  Even in a settlement built 
around partition there are clear issues which require extra-territorial structures and 
guarantees.  While any future settlement will have to provide for a Palestinian capital 
in East Jerusalem, the question of Jerusalem is highly unlikely to be resolved around a 
simple division.  Some form of special status which creates a capital city for Palestine 
without an absolutist statement of sovereignty seems the most likely outcome.  Water, 
refugees and the question of any remaining Israeli settlements within Palestinian 
territory all require a level of bilateral co-operation as great if not greater than that 
between two friendly neighbours.  To achieve this after years of conflict will require 
that these issues are built into the structure of the settlement.  
                                                          
36 Article 5:3, “Oslo One”, Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, 13 September 
1993 
37 See for example, As’ad Ghanem, ‘State and minority in Israel: the case of the ethnic state and the predicament of 
its minority’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 21:3, (1998); Nadim N Rouhana, Palestinian Citizens in an Ethnic Jewish 
State: Identities in Conflict, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997) 
  
Flexible models of sovereignty are in actual use in Kosovo and Northern Ireland.  
They can be empirically seen elsewhere in the programmes of political movements 
and in pragmatic solutions drafted in situations of conflict and contested sovereignty.  
Like most such developments the arrangements are ad hoc, occasionally internally 
conflicting but nonetheless exist.  The challenge for the academic discipline is to push 
the boundaries of our conceptual understanding, to create new models of sovereignty 
and of citizenship which are flexible enough to meet the challenge of the 
contemporary world.  Not only will this allow us to offer a much more convincing 
explanation of what is already happening in the world, perhaps more importantly it 
can also play a role in developing new models of sovereignty which can provide real 
and meaningful inputs into conflict resolution processes. 
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